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Brain signature of moral sensitivity in adolescents with early 
social deprivation 
The present study examined neural responses associated with moral sensitivity in 
adolescents with a background of early social deprivation. Using high-density 
electroencephalography (hdEEG), brain activity was measured during an 
intentional inference task, which assesses rapid moral decision-making regarding 
intentional or unintentional harm to people and objects. We compared the 
responses to this task in a socially deprived group (DG) with that of a control 
group (CG). The event-related potentials (ERPs) results showed atypical early and 
late frontal cortical markers associated with attribution of intentionality during 
moral decision-making in DG (especially regarding intentional harm to people). The 
source space of the hdEEG showed reduced activity for DG compared with CG in the 
right prefrontal cortex, bilaterally in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), 
and right insula. Moreover, the reduced response in vmPFC for DG was predicted by 
higher rates of externalizing problems. These findings demonstrate the importance 
of the social environment in early moral development, supporting a prefrontal 
maturation model of social deprivation. 
 
Children in foster care and institutional rearing are exposed to early social deprivation, 
which triggers important delays in physical, cognitive, behavioral, and socio-emotional 
development1-4. During adolescence, such socio-cognitive impairments persist and may 
even increase over time5-7. One social cognitive ability that proves particularly sensitive 
to neurodevelopment during adolescence is moral cognition8-10. Moral sensitivity (see 
Introduction within the Supplementary Data) results from complex processes shaped by 
evolutionary and cultural history11. This domain reflects the complex integration of 
several psychological processes, including emotion, cognition, and mental-state 
reasoning8,12. In the present study, we examined the neural correlates of an intentional 
inference task (IIT) indexing rapid moral decision-making in adolescents with early 
social deprivation. 
Brain regions engaged by the IIT8,11 and other moral tasks13,14 include aspects of the 
posterior superior temporal sulcus [pSTS, also reported as the temporoparietal junction 
(TPJ)], amygdala, ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), lateral prefrontal cortex 
(lPFC), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and insula. Source estimation of high-density 
electroencephalography (hdEEG) during the IIT has previously shown early engagement 
of the pSTS, amygdala, and vmPFC11. Moreover, the IIT has also been used in a 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiment8. Through effective 
connectivity analyses, this study demonstrated that, relative to other relevant areas, 
the amygdala, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), and medial prefrontal cortex 
(mPFC) were more sensitive to neurodevelopmental changes through the lifespan. 
Institutionalization and early social deprivation produce considerable behavioral and 
neurophysiological impairments. Behavioral deficits affecting social cognition have been 
reported in various domains, such as emotion regulation and recognition2,15,16 and 
theory of mind (ToM)5,17,18. To date, however, the neural correlates of moral sensitivity 
in adopted or institutionalized children remain unexplored, although this ability seems to 
be impaired in orphaned adolescents9. Furthermore, physically abused/neglected 
children show deficits in moral development19. Tentatively, these findings may reflect 
early deprivation20 and suggest neurodevelopmental changes in moral sensitivity. 
Institutionalization impacts the development of neural structures subserving high-level 
cognition and moral sensitivity, such as the orbitofrontal cortex/vmPFC, infralimbic 
prefrontal cortex, temporal medial areas, amygdala, lateral temporal cortex, and 
brainstem regions21. Brain connectivity22, volumetric morphometry3,23,24, and 
electrocortical responses to emotional stimuli25 are atypical in children/adolescents with 
early deprivation. Atypical patterns of brain activity in deprived individuals suggest a 
delay in cortical development26, linked to symptoms of hyperactivity and impulsivity27. 
In this study, we used the IIT to investigate the neural correlates of moral sensitivity. 
We compared the brain responses elicited by morally-laden scenarios in two groups: (i) 
an early social deprivation group (DG), composed of adolescents (between 11 and 15 
years of age) with a background of early social deprivation; and (ii) a control group 
(CG) matched for age, gender, executive functioning (EF), and educational level. Given 
that institutionalization can affect domain-general cognitive processes28, we also 
controlled EF and other basic processes. Additionally, we measured the participants’ 
behavioral deficits to assess subtle effects of institutionalization6,7,29. We used a well-
established moral sensitivity paradigm that is modulated by neurodevelopmental 
changes. This instrument has been validated through hdEEG11 as well as fMRI and eye-
tracking measurements8. We recorded hdEEG during the IIT, to evaluate rapid moral 
decisions regarding actions that results in harming (intentionally or unintentionally) for 
different target types (object or persons, Figure 1a). The following results were 
predicted: (1) relative to CG, DG will show abnormal brain responses associated with 
intentionality attribution in morally-laden scenarios (2) neural responses to the 
perception of intentional harm vs. unintentional harm, as established through source 
estimation, will be correlated between groups with different responses in IIT-related 
brain areas (mPFC, vmPFC, insula, and pSTS/TPJ); and (3) these differential responses 
will be predicted by individual differences in behavioral disturbances. 
Results 
Neuropsychological assessment  
Both groups showed similar neuropsychological profiles. CG performed better than DG on 
cube construction (t (35) = 2.15, p < 0.05, two-tailed) and the Trail Making Test B (t (35) = 
2.45, p < 0.05, two-tailed). No significant differences between groups were observed for 
picture arrangement, coding, digits and symbol search, the verbal fluency task, or the Trail 
Making Test A (see Table 1). 
Behavioral problems 
The Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL) revealed no significant differences between groups on 
externalizing (t (35) = 0.27, p = 0.79, two-tailed) and internalizing problems (t (35) = 0.17, 
p = 0.86, two-tailed). 
IIT (behavior) 
Accuracy measure. Consistent with previous IIT reports8,11, the principal outcome of this task 
was an interaction between target type (object vs. person) and intention to harm 
(intentional vs. unintentional) (F (1,35) = 37.41, p < 0.001). A post-hoc analysis (Tukey 
HSD, MSE = 46.16, df =35) showed higher accuracy ratings for person stimuli in intentional 
(M = 70.01; SE = 4.08) than in accidental (M = 55.02; SE = 2.63) situations (p < 0.001). 
However, this effect was not observed for objects. No between-group differences were 
observed (see Figure 1b and Supplementary Data). 
IIT (ERPs) 
Based on previous reports of ERPs elicited by painful stimuli30-32, we selected three regions of 
interest (ROIs) (at frontal, central, and posterior sites) and two time windows (early [within 
stimulus presentation] and late [after stimulus presentation]) (see Methods). 
Early window  
All ROIs. An interaction of ROI x intention x group (F (2, 70) = 9.81, p < 0.001; η2 = 0.21) 
was observed. For CG, as regards the frontal ROI, a post-hoc analysis (Tukey HSD, MSE = 
52.49, df = 43.28) showed a trend towards increased activation for intentional harm 
compared with unintentional harm (p = 0.07). For DG, these effects were non-significant in 
the frontal ROI, but they did reach significance (and opposite in direction) in the CZ ROI 
(intentional > unintentional, p = 0.008). 
Frontal effects. Given the general effects of ROI (F (2, 70) = 60.64, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.63) 
and the interactions reported above, we performed separate analyses at the frontal ROI for 
each group. 
In CG, activity was greater for person than object stimuli (target effect F (1, 17) = 5.81, p = 
0.02, η2 = 0.25). We also observed an interaction of target x intention (F (1, 17) = 2.26, p = 
0.15, η2 = 0.31). Post-hoc comparisons of person stimuli (Tukey HDS, MSE = 56.93, df = 
17) showed enhanced responses for intentional than unintentional scenarios (p = 0.024). 
For its own part, DG exhibited no significant effects of intention or target (or interactions) at 
the frontal ROI (see Figure 1c and 2). 
Late window  
Late-window effects were very similar to those observed in the early window. See 
Supplementary Data for details. 
Source space 
Early window. A comparison of the relevant category (person intentional) between groups 
showed significantly higher activity for CG than DG (Figure 3a) in the right PFC (t = 309.14, 
p < 0.01), left vmPFC (t = 98.38, p = 0.02), and right vmPFC (280-300 ms: t = 110.85, p = 
0.01). In addition, tendencies of higher activity for CG than DG were observed in the left PFC 
(200-270 ms, t = 33.16, p = 0.06) and at an earlier latency in the right vmPFC (140-200 
ms: t = 32.85, p = 0.06), as shown in Figure 3c. 
Late window. Enhanced activation (Figure 3b) for CG than DG was also observed in the right 
insula (t = 148.09, p < 0.01), the right PFC (600-700 ms: t = 309.14, p < 0.01; and 700-
800 ms: t = 52.99, p = 0.03), the left vmPFC (t = 121.54, p < 0.01), and the right vmPFC 
(t = 234.17, p < 0.01). Finally, a trend towards greater activity in CG relative to DG was 
observed in the left PFC (t = 34.83, p = 0.05) and the left anterior temporal lobe (left ATL, t 
= 26.75, p = 0.07), as shown in Figure 3c. 
Association between source estimation and behavioral problems (CBCL) 
No effects were observed for both groups regarding significant z scores (brain sources of 
person intentional stimuli) and behavioral scores (CBCL). Nevertheless, DG exhibited a 
significant inverse relationship between CBCL (externalizing factor) and z scores from the 
right vmPFC (combining both early and late windows) (r = - .48, p < 0.05), as shown in 
Figure 1d. 
Discussion 
The effects of early social deprivation on cognitive development have been widely studied in 
children and adolescents. Nevertheless, to our knowledge, no study has examined the neural 
correlates of moral sensitivity in these populations. Moral development involves a 
fundamental social adaptation and is crucial for successful social functioning in families, peer 
groups, and other environments19. Early childhood deprivation has been associated with 
maladaptive behaviors and social problems, including maladjustment, impulse control, and 
rule breaking7,29. In this study, we assessed the neural correlates of moral sensitivity in 
adolescents with early social deprivation using an ecologically valid non-verbal task while 
controlling for EF and educational level. In this group (DG), we observed atypical early/late 
cortical markers associated with intentionality attribution during moral decision-making, 
particularly those regarding intentional situations involving persons. Importantly, the source 
space for the latter condition showed that activation patterns were reduced for DG than 
controls in the right PFC, bilateral vmPFC, and right insula. Additionally, activation of the 
right vmPFC was inversely correlated with behavioral problems in DG. These results indicate 
that individuals with a background of early social deprivation exhibit atypical brain activity 
when processing moral information in the prefrontal cortex. This is the first demonstration 
that early social deprivation affects late neurodevelopment in the domain of moral decision-
making.  
Immature development of the prefrontal cortex1,26,27 has been associated with early-life 
stressful experiences and social deprivation. Also, the vmPFC has been linked to moral 
judgments33-35 but not to capacities for general intelligence, logical reasoning, or declarative 
knowledge 35,36. Importantly, the vmPFC is critical to process affective responses shaped by 
conceptual information about specific outcomes37. These results are consistent with our 
findings that DG exhibited atypical neural responses in the context of preserved general 
cognitive skills. 
The neural modulation of intentionality and target categories observed in CG is consistent 
with previous EEG/ERPs results11. At both early (~200 ms) and late (~600 ms) time 
windows, modulations were strongest for scenarios depicting intentional harm to people. 
Previous studies have shown that situations depicting intentional harm lead to differential 
activation of the amygdala/temporal pole and vmPFC11. Conversely, in DG, evoked neural 
responses (mainly at frontal ROIs) failed to discriminate rapid moral sensitivity to scenarios 
involving intention to harm. Unlike controls, DG showed no neural facilitation for person 
intentional situations in frontal regions. Neural facilitation in the vmPFC is critical when 
affective responses are shaped by conceptual information about specific outcomes37. Early 
social deprivation has negative consequences on emotional capacities in late 
development4,18. This would explain why CG, and not DG, exhibited stronger modulation for 
stimuli conveying intentional harm to people. The absence of stronger cortical activity in DG 
when viewing intentional harm to people suggests an immaturity in the neurocognitive 
mechanism supporting moral sensitivity. Therefore, our results parallel reports of delayed 
frontal lobe maturation in institutionalized children26,27. 
Source space analysis demonstrated that DG showed reduced activation in the right PFC, 
bilateral vmPFC, and right insula. These regions are engaged by the IIT and are in typically 
developing children strongly associated with the affective component of moral decision-
making8,11. Also, our results are consistent with the neurodevelopmental effects observed in 
the right PFC and the bilateral vmPFC in institutionalized children21. Note that reduced (late-
window) activation in the insula and bilateral vmPFC has been previously linked to immature 
emotional regulation and delayed frontal maturation in children within deprivation contexts27. 
Building upon this empirical background, our results indicate that social deprivation has 
specific effects on the development of the neural substrates underlying moral sensitivity.  
No significant differences in behavioral problems were found between DG and CG. This 
replicates previous findings in studies comparing adopted adolescents and controls38. 
However, for the DG, in our study, externalizing problems (e.g., delinquent and aggressive 
behaviors) were negatively associated with brain activity in the right vmPFC: the lesser the 
vmPFC activation, the higher the behavioral problems. Such a correlation aligns well with 
studies implicating the right vmPFC as a crucial region for emotional regulation and decision 
making39-41, and with reports of maladaptive social behaviors subsequent to vmPFC 
lesions33,42. In a similar vein, juvenile psychopaths with callous-unemotional traits present 
atypical fronto-central neural dynamics of affective arousal during empathy-for-pain 
processing, coupled with relative insensitivity to first-hand physical pain43. Taken together, 
these previous findings and our present results suggest a delayed maturation of the PFC 
regions involved in moral sensitivity and externalizing problems.  
No significant between-group differences were found for the behavioral measures of moral 
sensitivity. This is consistent with previous IIT studies reporting that all participants (age 
range 4-37) were able to distinguish between intentional and unintentional actions. Given 
the straightforwardness of the task, moral judgment involving evaluation of intentional or 
unintentional harm did not vary as a function of age8,11. Young children as early as 3 years 
old are capable to detect intentionality during moraly-laden tasks44. However, the IIT is 
sensitive to changes in neurodevelopment, as it reveals differential activation and functional 
connectivity patterns across age8,11. In this sense, our study showed that early social 
deprivation does not affect the accuracy of the IIT, but it does have neurodevelopmental 
effects. 
Using a neuropsychological battery, we controlled for the influence of basic cognitive 
impairment on moral decision-making. With these measures, we ensured that DG included 
only high-functioning individuals (participants with strong cognitive deficits were excluded). 
We found only subtle differences in neuropsychological outcomes associated to visuomotor 
abilities and cognitive flexibility, as previously reported in other studies with institutionalized 
children1,5,28. In growing up, our DG participants received social and affective support from 
their adoptive families. As compared with institutional rearing, foster care induces 
improvement in cognitive abilities45, which would explain why our participants exhibited 
neither cognitive impairments nor strong behavioral problems. 
Understanding the intentions behind a harmful action in an interpersonal context is both a 
cognitive and an emotionally-laden task. It involves ToM46 processing of the perpetrator’s 
and the victim’s behaviors as well as the ability to empathize47. Both ToM and empathy are 
high-level mechanisms engaging several neural and psychological sub-components46,47. They 
depend on the individual’s social experiences and involve a contextual dialogue between the 
emotions and intentions of others48. These mechanisms can be learned. In fact, certain 
forms of therapy imply training in these domains. Relative to their home-raised 
counterparts, children growing in socially deprived environments usually receive less 
attention from their caregivers. Consequently, they are less frequently exposed to situations 
requiring an understanding of the intentions and emotions of others, or even of themselves. 
Therefore, it is plausible that our DC participants exhibited a weaker maturation of the brain 
areas underpinning emotion regulation (vmPFC, insula) and ToM (vmPFC, PFC). 
Our study is the first report of atypical neural processing of moral sensitivity in socially 
deprived children. However, several lines of research need to be addressed in future studies. 
Admittedly, our sample size was moderate. However, it is not smaller than that of previous 
studies on social deprivation3,21,22. Our sample size is partially explained by the restricted 
recruitment procedures and the inclusion of only high-functioning participants in DG. A 
previous study using the IIT with EEG has proven sensitive with data obtained with less than 
10 participants11. Nevertheless, future studies may consider recruiting larger samples 
through the inclusion of participants with different degrees of cognitive impairment. A second 
limitation is the limited information about pre-adoptive care, which is a common issue for 
adopted participants23,49. For instance, we lacked data regarding prenatal risk factors, such 
as prenatal nutrition, maternal stress during pregnancy, or prenatal exposure to alcohol. The 
role of these prenatal and postnatal antecedents in moral cognition should be assessed in 
future studies. Finally, both the impairment profiles and the efficacy of intervention 
strategies in socially deprived participants should be assessed using sensitive measures of 
frontal maturation and moral cognition. 
In conclusion, the present study constitutes a novel experimental approach to examine 
moral sensitivity in socially deprived adolescents. Specifically, it brings together ecologically 
valid non-verbal stimuli and simple, efficient measures of relevant neurodynamic signatures. 
While different aspects of basic cognitive delay associated with early social deprivation have 
been reported previously, our study offers pioneering evidence of atypical brain activity 
underlying moral sensitivity with spared basic cognitive domains. Our data, obtained from 
combining EEG/ERPs, source space, and brain-behavior associations, support a prefrontal 
maturation model of social deprivation. Such findings offer new insights into the 
neurodevelopment of morality50,51 after social deprivation, thus opening promising avenues 
for further research. 
Methods  
Participants. The present study was conducted in the context of the Attachment & Adoption 
Research Network (AARN), an international project focusing on adopted adolescents 
[http://aarnetwork.wordpress.com/]. Our sample included two groups: (i) DG participants, 
who had experienced early social deprivation of at least 6 months (18 reared in institutional 
care and 2 reared in foster care), and (ii) CG participants, namely, non-adopted adolescents 
who grew up in their biological families (N = 20). Three cases (DG = 1, CG = 2) were later 
excluded because of excessive artifacts in the EEG recordings. DG consisted of 19 adopted 
adolescents (9 females) between 11 and 15 years of age. Their mean age was 12.58 years 
(SD = 1.3), and their mean adoption age was 30.05 months (SD = 21.68; range = 6–72 
months). The adopted adolescents were recruited from the following Chilean adoption 
agencies: Servicio Nacional de Menores (SENAME), Fundación Chilena para la Adopción and 
Fundación San José para la Adopción. CG was composed of 18 adolescents reared by their 
biological parents (8 females). The mean age for both groups was 12.56 years (SD = 1.3). 
CG was recruited from social networks (e.g., Facebook groups and chain letters). We 
controlled for differences in age (t (35) = 0.052, p = 0.96), sex (χ2(1) = 0.24, p = 0.62), 
and education level (t (35) = 0.30, p = 0.77) between the groups. The participants had no 
history of physical or mental disorders, as assessed through a neuropsychiatric interview 
with the parents and the institutions’ records. Parents and adolescents gave informed 
consent in agreement with the Declaration of Helsinki. The Ethics Committee of the School of 
Psychology of the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile approved all experimental 
procedures. 
Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL)52. We used the CBCL to assess the adolescent’s behavior, 
emotional problems, and relevant symptoms. Parents completed a 120-item questionnaire 
indicating whether a behavior was (0) “not”, (1) “a little/sometimes” or (2) “often/clearly” 
typical of their child. The Total Problems score consists in the sum of the scores of eight sub-
scale syndromes. Some are combined in the following two total sub-scales: internalizing 
(withdrawn, anxious/depressed behavior, and somatic problems) and externalizing 
(delinquent and aggressive behavior). The CBCL is the most common assessment of general 
behavioral problems in studies of the adopted population6,7,29. 
Neuropsychological assessment. All participants completed a neuropsychological battery 
assessing attention, speed processing, visual-spatial abilities, and EF. In the verbal fluency 
task, participants were given a category or a letter and asked to state all of the words that 
came to mind in one minute. In the digit-span subtest53, participants were asked to repeat a 
given set of numbers in the same order (forward digit-span) or in the reverse order 
(backward digit-span). The block-design task53 required participants to arrange cubes with 
red, white, or red and white sides to form a specific pattern. For the picture-arrangement 
task53, participants were required to piece together a misarranged story into the correct 
order. In the symbol-search task53, participants were asked to decide whether a given 
symbol was present in a line-up of other symbols. The coding subtest53 involved using a key 
of symbols to decipher a numerical code. To measure attention and speed processing, we 
incorporated the trail-making test54, which entailed connecting numbers (test A) or letters 
and numbers (test B) that were randomly aligned on a sheet of paper. 
Intention Inference Task (IIT). EEG signals were recorded while participants completed a 
modified version of a standard IIT developed by Decety and colleagues8 for 
neurodevelopmental studies of empathy and morality. The IIT assesses rapid moral decisions 
regarding actions involving harm to others (intentional vs. unintentional) with different 
target types (object vs. person). Participants were asked to evaluate whether the actions 
they had seen were performed intentionally or unintentionally11. In our study, participants 
were presented with a series of three-frame videos on a computer screen. The first frame 
(T1) was 100-ms long and displayed an establishing scene. The second frame (T2) was a 
100 ms frame denoting either intentional or unintentional harm. This was followed by a third 
100-ms frame (T3), confirming the intentional or unintentional harm. The trials began with a 
fixation cross presented for 800 ms. A 500 ms inter-trial interval was added. During the 
experiment, accuracy and reaction times were recorded. There were 184 trials (46 per 
condition: Person Intentional, Person Unintentional, Object Intentional, and Object 
Unintentional). The percentage of preserved trials after ICA correction was always > 87% for 
each category. 
Procedure. Once the family was contacted, all participants and their parents signed a 
consent form. Afterwards, we conducted an interview with each the mother of each 
adolescent. First, we tested the participants with a neuropsychological battery to assess 
general cognitive processes. While the participants performed the IIT, we recorded the EEG. 
EEG recordings and preprocessing. EEG signals were recorded with HydroCel Sensors from a 
GES300 Electrical Geodesic amplifier at a rate of 500 Hz using a system of 129-channels. 
Data that were outside a 0.1 Hz to 100 Hz frequency band were filtered out during the 
recording. Later, the data were further filtered using a band-pass digital filter with a range of 
0.3 to 30 Hz to remove any unwanted frequency components. During recording, the vertex 
was used as the reference electrode by default, but signals were re-referenced offline to 
average electrodes. Two bipolar derivations were designed to monitor vertical and horizontal 
ocular movements (EOG). Continuous EEG data were segmented during a temporal window 
that began 200 ms prior to the onset of the stimulus and concluded 800 ms after the offset 
of the stimulus. Eye-movement contamination and other artifacts were removed from further 
analysis using both an automatic (ICA) procedure and a visual procedure. No differences 
were observed between groups regarding the number of trials. All conditions yielded a 
percentage of artifact-free trials that was at least 80%. 
ERP preprocessing and analysis. 
For ERPs, we used a strategy of channel selection based on the observed effects (previously 
reported in ERP studies of empathy31,32). The time-course analysis for three representative 
ROIs (FZ, CZ and PZ) involving six adjacent electrodes (see Supplementary Data) was 
included as an additional within-subject ANOVA factor (electrode). We considered mean 
amplitude values. An early window before the end of stimulus presentation (150-300 ms) 
was selected to track the early automatic responses. A late window (600-800 ms) 
corresponds to the time-window effects observed in a previous report of the ITT11 with T1 
stimuli presented by 500 ms. The onset was marked at the T2 stimulus onset, and reliable 
effects were observed after 200 ms (equivalent to 600-800 ms windows in our design). 
Data analysis 
A Student’s t-test was used to compare the demographics and the neuropsychological and 
behavioral problems across groups. Repeated ANOVAs and Tukey HSD post-hoc comparisons 
(when appropriate) were performed to analyze behavioral IIT, reaction time, and ERP data 
(we included a measure of effect size, namely, partial eta (η2)). Source reconstruction 
analysis was tested with two-tailed t-tests using permutations to generate the null 
hypothesis distribution (for details, see Supplementary Data). The Pearson product-moment 
correlation coefficient was computed to evaluate the association of behavioral outcome 
(CBCL) with source space brain correlates of the relevant category (person intentional).  
Source reconstruction analysis 
Cortical current density mappings of ERPs for the intentionally-harmed-persons condition 
were reconstructed using the BrainStorm package55. The forward model was calculated using 
the Open MEEG Boundary Element Method56 on the cortical surface of a template MNI brain 
(colin27 atlas) with a 1-mm resolution. The inverse model was constrained using a weighted 
minimum-norm estimation (wMNE)57 to estimate source activation in picoampere-meters 
(pA.m). For each subject, an absolute average over trials was computed for each condition. 
These activation values for each participant and condition were normalized by calculating the 
z-scores of the primarily computed average relative to the baseline activity within the -200 
to 0 ms window. These z-scores were used to plot cortical maps and to extract the ROIs that 
were visually identified in the cortical maps. 
Several scouts (BrainStorm jargon for the ROIs that are defined as a subset of vertices of 
the surface) were selected from two different atlases58,59. In addition, some scouts were 
manually constructed using the BrainStorm toolbox to improve surface segmentation. 
Selection of the ROIs for source analysis was based on previous fMRI8 and evoked magnetic 
field studies that reported the neural generators of empathy-related processes and the ERPs 
that were presently analyzed. Based on previous studies of moral evaluations and empathic 
responses, we expected to observe major activity in the vmPFC, dlPFC, pSTS, amygdala, and 
insula for the intentionally-harmed-persons condition8,11. Based on a prior study60, we 
expected higher activity in the vmPFC, dlPFC, and amygdala for CG than DG, and higher 
activity in the right pSTS/TPJ for DG than CG. We expected these effects to occur in two 
different time windows: an early time window between 150 and 300 ms after stimulus onset, 
and a late time window between 600 and 800 ms after stimulus onset. For more details 
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Figure 1. Stimulus examples and summary of results. (a) Examples of the visual stimuli 
used in the study depicting people (top row) or objects (bottom row) being harmed 
intentionally (left) or by accident (right). The stimuli were short dynamic visual scenarios. 
(b) Accuracy and reaction times for both groups (CG and DG). (c) ERPs for early and late 
windows at frontal ROIs for both groups (CG and DG). (d) A significant negative linear 
association of DG’s externalizing problems with a signal change was observed in the right 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (r = - .48, p < 0.05). This effect was significant both 
including all cases (r = - .48, p < 0.05) and after excluding two moderate deviant values 
(data point 29 and data point 21: r = -.59, p < .05).  PI: person intentional; PU: person 
unintentional; OI: object intentional; OU: object unintentional. Figure 1a is reproduced with 
permission from Cerebral Cortex8. 
Figure 2. ERPs for all conditions and groups. Frontal, central, and posterior ROIs showing 
the different category modulations for both CG and DG. When the effects of condition and 
group were analyzed without considering the ROI variable (not shown in the figure), in both 
groups person intentional (PI) stimuli elicited enhanced activation relative to person 
unintentional (PU), but the CG exhibited a trend toward increased activation of intentional 
compared with unintentional stimuli. More importantly, when separate ROIS analyses were 
performed (as detailed in the figure), in frontal ROIs, CG had increased amplitudes for 
person intentional (PI) compared with person unintentional (PU). This effect was absent in 
DG.  
Figure 3. Source-space comparison of PI in CG and DG. (a and b) Differences in cortical 
activation between CG (red) and DG (blue) in z-scores. Panel (a) shows the peak difference 
in the early time window (150-300 ms), while panel (b) shows the peak difference in the late 
time window (600-800 ms). Panels (c) and (d) show significant differences in cortical 
activation between groups in z-scores. The values shown are averages over subjects and 
time. During the early time window (c), significantly higher activity for CG relative to DG was 
observed in the right prefrontal cortex (PFC) and both the left and the right ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). During the late time window (d), significantly higher activity for 
CG relative to DG was observed in the right PFC, left and right vmPFC, and right insula. 
vmPFC: ventromedial prefrontal cortex; PFC: prefrontal cortex.  
 
Table 1 
Demographic Data   
 DG CG DG vs. 
CG 
 M SD M SD  
Age 12.58 1.3 12.56 1.3 NS 
Years of 
Education 
7.05 1.39 6.83 1.15 NS 
Gender (M:F) 10:9  10:8  NS 
 
Neuropsychological Assessment 
Coding 48.11 9.036 51.22 9.490 NS 
Picture 
Arrangement 
21.63 7.595 25.11 6.720 NS 
Cube 
Construction 
38.63 10.616 46.00 10.186 0.038 
Symbol Search 23.95 5.930 25.06 5.546 NS 
Digits 10.84 3.671 11.67 2.326 NS 
Verbal Fluency 71.55 64.803 97.14 77.636 NS 
TMTA 45.63 12.006 45.39 11.587 NS 
TMTB 129.37 53.904 94.61 27.421 0.019 
      
Behavioral problems 
Externalizing 9.74 8.530 10.56 9.697 NS 
Internalizing  8.58 6.526 9.00 8.160 NS 
  
IIT Behavioral Measures 
 Accuracy (%) 
 DG  CG 
 M SD  M SD 
Object intentional 63.60 28.60  71.74 17.72 
Object 
unintentional 
62.26 15.05  70.44 17.52 
Person intentional 64.61 27.97  75.41 20.95 
Person 
unintentional 
48.93 17.22  61.11 14.51 
 RT (ms)  
 DG  CG 
 M SD  M SD 
Object intentional 748.90 311.88  822.29 234.80 
Object 
unintentional 
894.13 402.67  868.39 277.48 
Person intentional 721.56 321.39  748.04 236.00 
Person 
unintentional 
902.90 460.84  921.32 284.99 
 
 



